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NECESSARY OPERATING INVENTORY: AN
INROAD INTO THE ORIGINAL PACKAGE DOCTRINE
United States Plywood Corp. v. City of 1lgo9m,
2 WFis.2d 567, 87 N.W.2d 481, cert. granted, 356 U.S. 957 (1958)
Plaintiff, a manufacturer, brought an action against defendant city
to recover taxes paid under protest. The goods included under the
general property tax were lumber and veneers imported from foreign
countries. The former had been sent unbound in railroad cars, and the
latter in bundles secured by metal bands and in wooden crates. When
received, the lumber was piled in plaintiff's. yards to facilitate drying,
and the veneers were stored, unopened, in plaintiff's warehouse until
needed for manufacturing veneered products. Defendant city taxed
one half the lumber and one half the veneers, these portions being taxed
on the basis of the tax assessor's determination that such amounts were
required to be on hand because reasonably necessary to meet plaintiff's
current operational needs as a manufacturer. The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin upheld the taxation over plaintiff's contention that the tax
violated article I, section 10 of the Constitution of the United States,
the relevant part of which states:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws ...
The framers of the Constitution appear to have had a dual pur-
pose in including this clause-to prevent discrimination against foreign
imports by means of taxation by the states, and to prevent the seaport
states, through which most foreign imports came, from burdening the
commerce of non-seaport states by taxing foreign imports destined for
those states.2 Thus in Brown v. Maryland,' a license fee imposed by a
state on the right to sell foreign imports was held to be in effect a tax
on the foreign goods themselves and was therefore declared uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, Chief Justice
Marshall stating that the prohibition applied so long as goods retained
their character as foreign imports and until this character had been lost
by the goods having become mixed up with the general mass of property
of the state. In so deciding, he laid down the general proposition that
the character of goods as imports continued while the goods remained
"the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or
12 Wis.2d 567, 87 N.,.2d 481 (1958), cert. granted, 356 U.S. 957 (1958).
2 MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (August 28, 1787)
(Scott ed.) 622; Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 266, 278-79 (1827).
3 2 5 U.S. 266 (1827).
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package in which it was imported," 4 or until used by the importer.'
This "original package doctrine" has been held to forbid state
taxation even when the tax was non-discriminatory,' or when the taxed
goods were being held for use in manufacture.' The doctrine has been
held not to apply after the foreign imports have been sold by the
importer,' or when they have been physically subjected to the manu-
facturing process.'
The instant decision holding that the tax on the lumber was con-
stitutional was unanimous. This holding is substantiated by the United
States Supreme Court in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 0 and was a
basis for the decision in Gulf Fisher es Company v. Maclnerney." Aside
from physical subjection to the manufacturing process through drying,
the majority in the instant case pointed" out that individual pieces of
lumber are nof necessarily original- packages;'" and that if the railroad
cars in which the lumber was shipped could be considered an original
package, 13 removal from the cars would be equivalent to opening an
original package,' 4 . thereby causing the original package doctrine im-
munity to cease.' 5
In the instant case, the upholding of the tax on the veneers was
not unanimous. The majority based its decision on the finding made
by the trial court and unchallenged on appeal that
The purpose for which the veneers were imported was to meet
the requirements of a going manufacturing concern; and one
of such requirements was the presence of a stockpile equal to
minimum current manufacturing requirements. 6
The Supreme Court of the United States has never ruled on this precise
point;, but in the Hooven & Allison Go. case, the Court reserved judg-
on such a hypothetical set of facts. 7
4 Id. at 280.
DId. at 281.
6 Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. 29 (1871).
7 Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).8 Waring v. Mayor, 75 U.S. 110 (1868).
9 Supra note 7; Gulf Fisheries Cbmpany v. MacIndrney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928).
10 Supra note 7,
11 Supra note 9.12 E. J. Stanton & Sons v. Los Angeles County, 78 Cal. App. 2d 181; 177 P.2d
$04, 808 (1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766.
13 Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466 (1922).
14 Mexican Petroleum Corp. v. South Portland, '121 Me. 128; 115 At. 900
(1922).
15 May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496 (1900).
lSupra note 1, 87 N.W.2d at 487.
17In that case the majority said: "Even though the inventory of raw material
required to be kept on hand to meet the current operational needs of a manu-
lacturing business could be thought to have then entered the manufacturing process,
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On the basis of the dual purpose of the constitutional provision,
it is arguable that in the instant case the tax on the veneers should be
upheld; the tax is non-discriminatory and its effect as a burden on the
commerce of other states for which plaintiff's goods may be destined,
is remote.18 This argument at first appears to justify taxation by showing
the original package doctrine to be too rigid if applied literally to the
facts in the instant case. The very usefulness of the original package
doctrine is, however, that it is easy to apply, justifying its rigidity. Any
solution to the problem of deciding when constitutional immunity from
taxation ends is certain to be, like the original package doctrine, somewhat
artificial because the determination of the point at which foreign goods
have lost their character as imports is highly conceptual. This was
implied in the ILooven & .llison Co. case where it was said that the
constitutional immunity must end at a point which is "capable of
practical determination."x9
A new exception to the original package doctrine, though it may
mitigate the artificiality of its application in a specific case, greatly in-
creases the impracticality of determining which goods are taxable. The
exception created in the instant case suggests that the assessor will have
to make a complex determination as to which goods in the original pack-
ages are absolutely necessary to the manufacturer as minimum current
manufacturing requirements. Furthermore, this complex determination
(the basis for the exception created in the instant case) would, if the
exception is to be followed in the future, appear to be equally applicable
to foreign goods in the original packages in the hands of retailers and
wholesalers.
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the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court did not rest on that ground, and the record
affords no basis for saying that any part of petitioner's fibers, stored in 'its ware-
house, were required to meet such immediate current needs. Hence we have no
occasion to consider that question." Supra note 7, at 667.
18 Thomas Reed Powell, commenting on the original package doctrine and
state taxation of foreign goods, said: "But it does not follow that subjection to a
general property tax would defeat the constitutional prohibition, unless one takes
a very literal view of the language of the clause and forgets the circumstances
which led to the aversion to local power to impose discriminatory barriers against
other products than those grown or produced in the consuming state." State
Taxation of Imports-W hen Does an Import Cease to be an Import?, 58 HARV. L
REv. 858, 875 n. 62 (1945).
19 In that case the majority said: "[T]he immunity [must], if it is to be
preserved at all, survive the landing of the merchandise in the United States and
continue until a point is reached, capable of practical determination, when it can
fairly be said that it has become a part of the mass of taxable property within a
state.... ." Supra note 7, at 667.
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